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Holland: Motor Vehicle--Family Purpose Doctrine--Adult Son

STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT OASES

MOTOR VEICLES-FAMILY

PURPOSE DOCTRINE-ADULT

SON.-

The ease of Jones v. Cook,' committed West Virginia to the socalled "family purpose" doctrine. The decision has been followed repeatedly. 2 A recent case 3 limited its application to cases
where the automobile was owned for family purposes and driven
by a member of the family at the time of the accident. A recent
decision of our supreme court extends the doctrine to cases where
the driver of the family automobile is an adult, sui juris,4living at
home, and driving the machine without parental consent.
After the decision of Jones v. Cook,5 the case was noted in the
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY. 6 The view was expressed therein
that the extension or warping of agency principles to cover such
cases was unwarranted by the necessity, especially since it seemed
the province of the legislature to provide for this liability. It is
now apparent that the doctrine is with us to stay and we accept
it as a part of the of law of this jurisdiction.
For purposes of discussion of this doctrine let us turn to an
examination of the law as it existed before the day of the automobile. We find that the principles of agency allow recovery for
injury against one who is not the wrongdoer where the wrongdoer is acting for the other in the capacity of servant or agent
and where the wrongful act can be said to be within the scope
of that authority or occupation. The owner of property was
never before held liable for the negligent use of bailed property
where he did not have a hand in the negligence and where the
property was not a dangerous instrumentality in itself. The responsibility of the bailee was enough. As to the torts of his own
family the person was not held liable unless his authorization or
participation was shown. With the coming of the automobile it
became necessary to apply old principles of tort liability and
agency to new relations and instrumentalities. The primary application is not difficult. We see that it is still the law, generally,
that in the ease of employees hired to operate the automobile the
owner is liable only where the injury complained of i. the result
of negligence of the employee while acting for the owner, and in
1 90 W. Va. 710, 111 S. E. 828 (1922); 96 W. Va. 60, 111 S. r. 828
(1924).
2 See Aggleson 'v. Kendall, 92 W. Va. 138, 114 S. E. 454 (1922) ; Ambrose
v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 130 S. E. 810 (1925).
3 Ritter v. Hicks, 102 W. Va. 541, 135 S. E. 601 (1926).
4 Watson v. Burley, 143 S. E. 95 (W. Va. 1928).
5 Supra, n. 1.
6 34 W. VA. L. QuAR. 53.
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the scope of the employment.' It is admitted by practically all
courts that the automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality in
itself, though some have held that where the owner intrusts the
car to a drunken or incompetent driver his negligence in so doing
will cause his liability to a person injured by such driver.8 It
follows that the owner is not liable for the negligence of a person
to whom the automobile is bailed, unless there was negligence in
the bailment. The decisive question here is--'Who had control
over the acts of the driver.' 9 As to members of the family of the
owner of the automobile the old rules would have created no liability for negligent operation of the vehicle unless the owner and
the person driving -be shown to be in the agency relation. The
parent was not responsible for the torts of the minor child. 10
This is the present holding in those jurisdictions which have refused application of the family purpose doctrine.
Just what is the true nature of the "family purpose" doctrine?
It originated from the desire of the courts to give a relief in cases
of injury by the then new and strange automobile. Where that
was a case of owner-driver it was a case of straight negligence.
Where the automobile was driven by another than the owner it
must be a case of agency or a dependency for relief on the
driver himself. In the case of the hired employee agency could,
and did, give relief on familiar principles. It often happened that
the driver was a member of the family of the owner, and generally one who was dependent on him. Moreover, such persons frequently had a general permission to operate the car for their
own use. It was an easy step, in such circumstances, to the holding that the owner was liable where it was shown that he had
furnished the car for the family, and where it was being used
for that general use, no matter how remote the use might be from
his intent or design. This doctrine applies only to cases wherein
the car is a "family" car, and where the driver is a member of
the family of the owner. Its application imposes a greater lia,bility on the owner of a family car than upon the owner of a
commercial car or a domestic car equipped with chauffeur. 11 If
7 Adomaities v. Hopkins, 95 Conn. 239, 111 Atl. 178 (1920); Wilson V.
Quick Tire Service, 52 Ga. App. 310, 123 S. E. 733 (1924); Reynolds V.
Buck, 127 Ia. 601, 103 N. W. 946 (1907); Langan v. Nathanson, 161 Minn.
433, 201 N. W. 927 (1918). These states have all applied the "family purpose" doctrine.
8 Elliot v. Harding, 107 Oh. St. 501, 140 N. E. 338 (1923); Mitchell V.
Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6, 36 A. L. R. 1132 (1922).
9 36 A. L. 1R. 1137, 1153; 42 A. L. R. 1446.
10 20 BR.C. L. "Parent and Child", §33.
11 Ritter v. Hicks, supra, n. 3; Johnston v. Hare, 246 Pac. 546 (1926);
Doss v. Elec. Light, etc., Co., 193 Ky. 499, 236 S. W. 1046 (1922); Richardson v. Weiss, 152 Minn. 391, 394, 188 N. W. 1008 (1922).
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we may conceive the field of liability for motor car injuries as an
entirety we perceive that the doctrine of the "family purpose"
car is a superstructure reared upon a small part of that field.
It is regarded as an unsatisfactory development by many of the
courts which apply it, and it is totally refused by perhaps as
many as have accepted it."
In the jurisdiction adopting this anomalous rule the orthodox
argument is that since the owner of the vehicle has made it his
business to furnish a motor car for his family the operation of
that car by any member of the family is an act in furtherance
of his design and in the course of his authority to the family, express or implied."
Some writers have advanced the opinion that the law of agency
owes its origin to the desire of the courts to fix a liability for the
act of the servant upon the master, one of the financially responsible. 4 In the beginning of that development it may have been
looked upon as anomalous. The great body of our law has developed gradually and by almost imperceptible expansion. It is
within the realm of possibility that this doctrine as to the family
12 The following cases approve:
Benton v. Regesser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179
Pac. 966 (1919); Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 Pac. 966 (1917);
Haugh v. Kirsch, 105 Conn. 429, 135 Atl. 568 (1927); Griffin v. Russell,
144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. 10 (1915); Collison v. Cutter, 186 Ia. 276, 170 N.
W. 420 (1919); Rauckhorst v. Kraut, 216 Ky. 323, 287 S. W. 895 (1926);
Payne v. Leininger, 160 Minn. 75, 199 N. W. 435 (1924) ; Linch V. Dobson,
108 Neb. 632, 188 N. W. 227 (1922; Boes v. Howell, 24 N. Mex. 142, 173
Pac. 966 (1918); Watts v. Leffler, 190 N. C. 722, 130 S. E. 630 (1925);
Ulman v. Lindeman, 44 N. D. 36, 176 N. W. 25 (1919); Foster v. Farra,
117 Ore. 286, 243 Pac. 778 (1926); Smith v. Jamison, 89 Pa. Super. 99,
(1926) Mooney v. Gilbreath, 124 S. C. 1, 117 S. E..186 (1923); King V.
Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (1918); Birch v. Abercrombie, 74
Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913); Jones v. Cook, supra, n. 1; Cloyes v.
Plaatje, 231 Ill. App. 183 (1923).
Contra: Johnson v. Newman, 168 Ark.
836, 271 S. W. 705 (1925); Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 Pac. 255
(1920) ; Daily v. Schneider, 118 Kan. 295, 234 Pac. 951 (1925); Fuller v.
Metcalf, 125 Me. 77, 130 Atl. 875 (1925); Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380,
116 AtlI. 645 (1922); McGowan v. Longwood, 242 Mass. 337, 136 N. E. 72
(1922); Bollman v. Bullene, 200 S. W. 1068 (Mo. 1918); Clawson V.
Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 208 Pac. 924 (1922); Elms v. Flick, 10o Oh. St.
186, 126 N. E. 66 (1919); Campbell v. Kirkpatrick, 120 Okla. 57, 249 Pac.
508 (1926); Landry v. Richmond, 45 R. I. 504, 124 Atl. 263 (1924); Afc.
Farland v. Winter, 47 Utah 598, 155 Pac. 437 (1916) ; Blair v. Broadwater,
121 Va. 301, 96 S. E. 632 (1918); Papke v. Hearle, 189 Wis. 156, 207 N.
W. 261 (1926); Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754, 71 AtI. 296 (1908)
distinguished in later cases, see Venghis v. Nathanson, 101 N. J. L. 110,
127 Atl. 175 (1925); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. il,
115 N. E.
443 (1917); (cf. McCrossen v.Moorehead, 200 N. Y. S. 581 (1923); Smith
v. Weaver, 73 Ind. App. 350, 124 N. E. 503 (1919).
'i Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40, 132 N. E. 817 (1921); King v. Smythe,
supra, n. 12; Jones v. Cook, supra, n. 1; Payne v. Leininger, aupra, n. 12.
14 See Y. B. Smith, 23 CoL. L. REv. 444.
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automobile may be, not an unwise expansion or mistreatment of
agency, but a new liability in tort which will become accepted by
degrees. In spite of the persistency of the courts in calling this
thing agency it is true even today that it resembles an independent tort liability-it need only be extended over the remainder
of the situations where the owner places a car in the hands of
another for operation. As to the wisdom, or necessity, of so extending it the courts or the legislature must decide, preferably
the legislature.
-R. P. HoLLANwD.

TAX EXEMiPTION
LIGIOUS AND

OF

PROPERTY

CHARITABLE

USED

FOR EDUCATIONAL,

RiE-

PURposE.-The Constitution of West

Virginia provides that "all property, both real anid personal, shall
be taxed in proportion to its value * " 0 but property used for
educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes;
all cemeteries and public property may, by law, be exempted from
taxation."' Pursuant to the authority vested in it by this provision of the Constitution the legislature has by statute exempted
certain property, among which is the following: "' *
property
used exclusively for divine worship; parsonages, * * * property
belonging to colleges, seminaries, academies, and free schools, if
used for educational, literary or scientific purposes * * * property
used for charitable purposes, and not held or leased out for profit,
0 * all property belonging to benevolent associations, not conducted for private profit, and used exclusively for the purposes
of moral and physical education, * * * any hospital not held
or leased out for profit; * " ' and, provided further, that such
exemption from taxation shall apply to all property, including
the principal thereof, and the income therefrom, held for a term
of years or otherwise under a bona fide deed of trust v * by a
trustee, e " required by the terms of such trust to apply, annully, the income derived from such property to education, religion, charity and cemeteries, when not used for private purposes or profit.
Several interesting questions have arisen, and may arise, under
these provisions of our Constitution and statute. Our first inquiry is, may the legislature exempt any property from taxation
that it chooses, or is it limited in that it can only exempt "property used for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable
'

I

Co.ST. art. 10, §1.
2 CODE, ch. 29, §57.

Note Amendment 1927 Acts, ch. 14.
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